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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES J. CONTREL, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 930588-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has 
appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a, Section 3(2) of the 
Utah Code (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of right from a final judgment of conviction for the offense of 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Do alterations to a vehicle, consistent with the existence of a secret 
compartment, constitute an articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed? 
Does the Constitution of Utah require that consent to search be both knowing 
and voluntary? 
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Was there sufficient attenuation between the unlawful stop and detention and 
voluntary consent to allow the evidence seized pursuant to such consent to be 
admissible? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves questions of law and the application of facts to legal 
standards. Such issues are reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial 
court's ruling. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in an information on February 4, 1992. (R.1) The 
information alleged the offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended), a Second Degree 
Felony. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. (R. 19-20) That motion was 
denied after an evidentiary hearing. (R. 61) The court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in relation to its ruling on that motion. (R. 62-65) Appellant 
entered a guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the ruling on the motion to 
suppress. (R. 74-82) Appellant was sentenced on September 2 1 , 1993, to the 
indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison. (R. 100-101) 
The trial court granted appellant's certificate of probable cause and continued 
appellant on bail to allow the suppression issue to be decided by this court. (R. 96) 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 4, 1992, Sergeant Paul Mangleson and trooper Lance Bushnell of 
the Utah Highway Patrol were on duty on Interstate 15 in Juab county, Utah. (R. 106, 
134) At about 2:00 p.m., the two were in Mangleson's vehicle, parked at mile post 
217. (R.106) They were about ten to fifteen feet off the side of the highway in the 
northbound lanes. At that time, Mangleson observed a late model pickup truck driving 
northbound on the interstate. (R. 106, 136) The troopers followed the truck for about 
two miles for the purpose of making observations. (R. 108, 136) In doing so, 
Mangleson drove his patrol vehicle behind the left side of the appellant's truck. (R. 
108, 136) 
Sergeant Mangleson noticed that the vehicle was a late model Chevrolet pickup 
truck. (R. 108) It had a heavy plastic bedliner and tool box in the bed of the truck (R. 
107, 108, 138) Mangleson also observed that the truck had a heavy metal bumper 
that had been bent upward. (R. 108, 136, 141) When Mangleson pulled next to the 
truck he was able to make some other observations by looking into the left rear wheel 
well. (R. 106-107) Mangleson was able to observe that the truck had been freshly 
undercoated. (R. 108, 138, 139) He noted that the gas tank was lower than those 
on factory issued models (R. 107, 108, 137, 139) and that heavy duty shocks had 
been added. (R. 137) Finally, Mangleson was able to observe that the airspace 
normally located between the frame and the bed of a pickup truck could not be seen. 
(R. 107, 108, 138, 139, 142) 
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Mangleson signaled the vehicle to stop at about milepost 215. (R. 108) At no 
time during the incident did Mangleson observe any traffic violations. (R. 115) The 
driver did not try to evade the troopers in any way. (R. 119) At one point the driver 
even waived at the troopers. (R. 118) Mangleson stopped the vehicle because 
conditions he observed were very similar to the conditions he had observed during a 
stop of a different truck several months earlier. (R. 108, 137)1 He testified that the 
alterations were consistent with a secret compartment located in the truck (R. 152) 
Mangleson indicated he had been involved in the stops of seven other vehicles with 
hidden compartments. (R. 142) Three of those were pickup trucks. (R. 108) One of 
those trucks contained no contraband in the hidden compartment. (R. 153) 
After stopping the vehicle, appellant was identified as the driver. (R. 109) 
Appellant produced a Florida driver's license. (R. 109) The vehicle registration was 
from Pennsylvania and was not in appellant's name. (R. 109) Appellant identified the 
owner as a friend of his. (R. 109) Mangleson requested permission to search the 
vehicle. Appellant agreed to the search. (R.110) Mangleson then had appellant sign 
a written waiver. (R. 110) Mangleson admitted if appellant had not consented to the 
search he would have conducted it anyway. (R. 110) Mangleson further indicated 
that the vehicle would be forfeited even if contraband had not been discovered. (R. 
123, 153) In searching the truck, Mangleson unbolted a plate behind the bumper and 
1Although Sergeant Mangleson described this other truck, no pictures of it were 
produced. He testified that he had access to those pictures and the negatives, but 
did not bring them to court. (R. 149) 
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observed a compartment. (R. 110-111) A quantity of marijuana was located in that 
compartment. (R. 111) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
To stop a vehicle on the highway a police officer must be able to describe 
reasonable articulable suspicions to demonstrate that a crime is being committed. The 
mere existence of a hidden compartment does not indicate that contraband may be 
contained in that compartment. There was an insufficient basis on which to stop the 
vehicle. The evidence seized as a result of such a stop must be ordered suppressed. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution should require that any consent 
to search be both voluntary and knowing. Policy considerations require that suspects 
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should be aware that they need not consent to a request by a law enforcement officer 
to conduct a search. 
Any consent that was given was not sufficiently attenuated from the initial 
illegal stop and detention. The consent was given a very short time after the stop. 
There were no intervening circumstances. The stop without an articulable suspicion 
that a crime was being committed constituted a purposeful or flagrant violation of the 
fourth amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MERE EXISTENCE OF A HIDDEN COMPARTMENT 
FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT 
APPELLANT WAS INVOLVED IN THE COMMISSION OF A 
CRIME. 
The stop of a motor vehicle by law enforcement officers is a detention. It is 
subject to the restrictions at the fourth amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. State v. Carpina 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986). In Caroina. the court 
noted that the legal basis for such a stop is described in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1953 as amended). That statute provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
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Such a "reasonable suspicion" must be based on objective facts. State v. Swanigan, 
699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). In State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), the 
court acknowledged that " . . . a trained law enforcement officer may be able to 
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to 
the untrained observer." JJL at 88. The court noted in Trujillo that the officer is 
entitled to assess his observations in light of his experience. However, in State v. 
Potter, _ P . 2 d _ , 224 U.A.R. 19 (Utah App. 1993), the court described articulable 
suspicion stating, "An officer must be able to articulate some unlawful or suspicious 
behavior connecting the detainee to suspect criminal activity." Id at 21 . 
The cases from the Utah appellate courts have required that the facts at issue 
in the case at bar be compared to other cases to determine if a temporary detention 
is justified. In State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2 181 (Utah 1987), the court found that 
there was no articulable suspicion for immigration officers to stop a vehicle. The 
justifications for the stop were that the occupants of the vehicle were hispanic, the 
vehicle had California license plates, it was northbound on Interstate 15 and did not 
change lanes when the agents' car approached at a high rate of speed. Similarly, in 
State v. Carpina, supra, the court held that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop 
a vehicle with Arizona license plates that was driving slowly in a residential 
neighborhood in the early morning hours. 
In State v. Swaniaan, supra, the court held that there were no articulable facts 
to justify the stop of two individuals near the scene of a residential burglary. An 
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officer responding to a burglary report observed two individuals about one block from 
the scene of the crime. After investigating the crime scene, the officer broadcast an 
attempt to locate the two with a description of them. About two hours later, two 
individuals matching the description from the broadcast were observed and detained 
three blocks from the burglary. The court stated that those facts failed to indicate 
that the defendants had been at the scene of the burglary or that they had engaged 
in any criminal behavior. In State v. Trujillo. supra, a police officer observed three 
individuals walking southbound on State Street in Salt Lake City at 3:00 a.m. One 
of the individuals was carrying a knapsack. When the officer approached, the 
individuals appeared to be nervous and the knapsack was placed in a position as if to 
conceal it. The court held that those observations did not constitute articulable facts 
to show that a crime was being committed. 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), involved a stop of the 
defendant at an airport. After deplaning, the defendant made a telephone call then 
walked to the entrance to the airport where he was about to enter a taxi cab. At the 
officer's request, the defendant allowed a search of his bag. He also raised his shirt 
where the officers observed that the defendant had tape wrapped around his waist 
which extended into his pants. During a pat down of the defendant's person the 
officers felt a bulge under the tape. The trial court held that these facts failed to 
establish a reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. That ruling was upheld on 
appeal. In another airport search case, State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
8 
1988), officers relied on seven factors to justify the detention of the defendant. 
Those factors were described by the court as follows: 
(1) Sery arrived from Florida; (2) waited a few minutes at 
the gate and looked nervously around there and before 
entering the snack bar; (3) went to a telephone booth and 
twice stood up and looked in the direction of the officers; 
(4) took a strange route from the phone booth area back to 
the concourse; (5) possessed a plane ticket on which he 
claimed his name had been inaccurately recorded; (6) told 
Pearson [the police officer] he had no identification on him; 
and (7) left a telephone number with the airline 
reservationist that had been changed to an unpublished 
number. 
Id at 942-943. The court found that all of this conduct was consistent with innocent 
behavior and held that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain the 
defendant to allow a dog to sniff his luggage for the contents of drugs. 
In State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1991), the defendant drove his 
pickup truck into a cul de sac where search warrants were being executed. When 
officers approached, he appeared to be nervous. The court held that those facts 
failed to establish a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in the 
commission of a crime. Similarly, the court of appeals has ruled that entering a 
residence that is the subject of police surveillance for drug trafficking, then leaving a 
short time later did not constitute an articulable suspicion. State v. Sykes, P.2d , 
198 U.A.R 17 (Utah App. 1992). The court found that such activity was consistent 
with innocent behavior even though the officer testified that the defendant's actions 
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were consistent with one making a drug purchase. In State v. Potter, supra, this 
court held that a person who enters then leaves a house that was under surveillance 
for drug activity could not be detained based on those facts alone. The information 
relating to the drug activity indicated that it was ongoing before the defendant had 
arrived. There were no facts to tie the defendant to any criminal activity. 
Furthermore, in State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), the court held that 
the fact that a parolee was in a car in a parking lot wearing a winter coat failed to 
establish a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in the commission of a crime. 
The court indicated that a bulge in the coat indicative of a firearm or threatening or 
evasive behavior by the defendant may have established a reasonable suspicion that 
he was committing a crime. However, those facts were not present in that case. 
In State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) this court held that the 
failure of a driver to look at a highway patrolman without any indication that the 
defendant was attempting to evade the officer or conceal contraband failed to 
establish a reasonable suspicion. Finally, in State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 
1988), the same sergeant Mangleson as was involved in the instant case, stopped a 
car because " . . . something struck [him] funny about [the license plate sticker]." The 
court held that information did not constitute an articulable suspicion necessary to 
justify the stop of the automobile. 
The facts in the instant case demonstrate that the truck driven by the 
defendant was different from the same models released from the factory. There is no 
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evidence to link the truck to places where drugs were used or distributed as in Sykes, 
Potter and Steward. Nor could the truck be connected to a high crime location or area 
where a crime had been committed as was the situation in Trujillo, Swanigan and 
Carpina. To allow officers to stop a vehicle for any purpose merely because it 
appeared different from other vehicles of the same model is indistinguishable from 
allowing officers to stop vehicles because the occupants were hispanic, as in 
Mendoza. or was a parolee as in White. This case is closely analogous to Baird where 
the stop was made because the license plate sticker looked unusual. Finally, the 
alterations to the vehicle in this case are very similar to a person wearing tape which 
covers a bulge on his person as was the situation in Carter. That factor did not 
constitute a reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed. There 
is nothing in the appearance of the truck inconsistent with innocent behavior. In 
ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. (R. 62-65). Other than the observations made by Mangleson that 
were consistent with the existence of a hidden compartment, the trial court did not 
enter any findings that would indicate appellant had contraband in the comipartment 
at the time of the stop. Nor did those findings indicate that any other crime or traffic 
offense was being committed prior to the stop. 
Several cases from other jurisdictions have found that the location of a hidden 
compartment is a factor that may be considered in determining if an officer has a 
reasonable suspicion to justify a continued detention. However, these cases involved 
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situations where the initial stop was made for reasons other than the existence of a 
hidden compartment. Furthermore, additional facts were considered in conjunction 
with the potential existence of a hidden compartment to establish a reasonable 
suspicion. In United States v. Rubio-Rivera. 917 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1990), the 
defendant had been stopped at an immigration checkpoint. Although the defendant 
had a valid immigration card, he was detained at a second checkpoint. At the time 
of the stop, the defendant appeared to be apprehensive and did not make eye contact 
with the agents. The defendant had been on a trip for several days but there was an 
inadequate amount of luggage for such a trip. The car had a Colorado license sticker, 
but the defendant stated that it had been purchased in El Paso, Texas. Finally, the 
agent observed a gasoline container inside of the car. That would be consistent with 
the existence of a concealed compartment in the gas tank. The court found that 
these facts were sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion to justify the continued 
detention to investigate the compartment. 
In United States v. Strickland, 920 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1990), the defendant 
had been stopped for a traffic violation. He consented to the search of the vehicle. 
The vehicle was a late model Mercedes sedan. An old tire was located in the trunk. 
The rim on the tire was rusted and bent and did not match the other wheels on the 
vehicle. The tire was a different make than the other tires on the car. It was also 
worn differently than any of the other tires. The court found that those facts justified 
a limited detention to conduct a further inspection of the tire. 
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The facts in the instant case fail to establish a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the defendant was engaged in the commission of a crime. There was 
nothing to link appellant to any illegal activity. The appellant took no evasive action 
when the trooper followed him and drove next to him. The appellant did not make 
any furtive gestures as if he was hiding or concealing contraband. The mere fact that 
the design of the truck had been altered does not indicate that the occupant is 
committing a crime. Likewise, the fact that a truck contains a secret compartment 
does not raise an inference that the occupant is committing a crime. The detention 
of the appellant violated his state and federal constitutional protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
POINT II 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
REQUIRES BOTH A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER 
BEFORE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A CONSENT 
TO SEARCH IS ADMISSIBLE. 
After sergeant Mangleson detained the defendant, he request permission to 
search the vehicle. The appellant gave verbal permission, then signed a consent to 
search form. The appellant was not told that he could decline to give his consent. 
The form did not indicate that the signor understood that he had the right to decline 
to allow officers to search the vehicle. This court should rule that Article I Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution requires both a knowing and voluntary waiver before a 
consent to search is valid. 
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This issue was raised in State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, in Bobo the court refused to address the issue because of inadequate 
briefing. In a footnote, the court suggested a three part analysis be employed in 
addressing novel state constitutional issues. First, the unique context of Utah's 
constitutional development should be discussed. Second, it should be shown that the 
state appellate courts give different interpretations to their respective constitutions 
than is given to the federal constitution. Third, citation to authority from other states 
supporting the particular construction that is urged should be provided. 
The state should be required to demonstrate that a person is aware that he 
need not submit to a search before it can claim that there was a valid consent to that 
search. The general purpose of such a requirement is to protect citizens from 
overreaching by law enforcement agents who may use very subtle, yet coercive 
means to obtain a consent to search. This requirement is also based on the concept 
that there is a strong presumption against waiver of important constitutional rights. 
State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.) ceu. dsn. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).2 
The Utah appellate courts have given a different interpretation to the Utah 
Constitution than has been given to the federal constitution on search and seizure 
issues. In State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court 
recognized that the Utah Constitution prohibited the opening of a vehicle door to 
2Cases involving fourth amendment analysis are cited for illustrative purposes only 
and are specifically not intended to mix state and federal constitutional analysis. 
Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032, (1984). 
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inspect a vehicle identification number. That was a position rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). Likewise, in State 
v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the state supreme court required a showing 
of probable cause to seize bank records and provided additional privacy protections 
in such records. In reaching that conclusion, the court rejected the Supreme Court's 
ruling in United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Finally, in State v. Sims. 815 
P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991) cert, granted 853 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1993), this court 
held that he state constitution requires specific statutory authorization to conduct a 
roadblock. This is a greater protection than has been provided under the 
interpretations of the federal constitution.3 
The history of the Utah Constitution has been discussed by one commentator.4 
In that article, it was noted, 
The majority of present state constitutions were drafted in 
the later half of the 19th century, an era of popular mistrust 
and hostility toward government. The people's mistrust of 
government is readily apparent on the face of many state 
constitutions. Utah's constitution, drafted in 1895, is 
representative of the era, particularly in light of the fact 
that most sections of the Utah constitution were copied 
3See: Michigan Department of State police v. Sitz. U.S. ,110 S.Ct.2481 
(1990). 
4Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government. The History of Utah's 
Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311. 
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from several other state constitutions drafted in the later 
part of the period.6 
The concept of barring the government from obtaining criminal convictions 
based on the misconduct of its agents serves as a limitation on governmental power. 
Giving the people broader protections under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is consistent with the historical development of the Utah Constitution. 
The majority of the justices in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 
(1973), held that there is no knowledge requirement for a waiver of fourth 
amendment rights. The Court held that knowledge is only a factor to consider in 
determining if there is a voluntary consent. However, the reasoning employed by the 
Court to reach that conclusion is flawed. As a basis for the decision the Court first 
relied on the line of cases dealing with voluntary confessions.6 Those cases did not 
require that the person subjected to the questioning be aware that he had the right to 
refuse to answer the questions. Employing that line of authority resulted in a test for 
voluntariness that was based on the totality of the circumstances to determine if the 
consent was voluntary or a product or a coercion of duress. The issue raised in those 
cases related to whether the police behavior amounted to compulsion. It makes no 
5Flynn, supra, at 344. 
6Brown v. Mississippi, 229 U.S. 278 (1936); Havnes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503 (1963): Blackburn v. Alabama. 361 U.S. 199 (1960). 
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sense to require that a person be aware that he is free from compulsion. The reliance 
on this line of cases in inappropriate to determine the issue of a consent to search. 
The second reason given in Schneckloth for not requiring a knowing waiver 
related to the problems the Court felt would be inherent in proving knowledge. 
However, if the police simply were to give a suspect a warning that he need not 
consent to a search, that should suffice to prove knowledge. The Court claimed that 
the giving of such warnings would be impractical. First, it would be impractical to 
formulate the warnings. Second, it would interrupt the flow of events and hinder 
police investigations. The first reason is simply wrong. Such warnings could be very 
specific and simple.7 As for the second reason, that is really an argument that favors 
requiring a warning. People should not be required to unknowingly waive fundamental 
constitutional rights under the pressures inherent in a police encounter. 
There are other problems with the argument that a warning would hinder police 
investigation. When a citizen's constitutional rights are weighed against the need to 
investigate a crime, the constitutional rights are obviously more important. In his 
dissenting opinion in Schneckloth. Justice Marshall addressed the issue of the 
practical need for police investigation. He stated, 
I must conclude with some reluctance that when the Court 
speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the 
7An appropriate statement by the officer may be: "You have the right to refuse 
to allow me to conduct a search. That refusal cannot be used by law enforcement 
officers as a reason to search or to obtain a search warrant." 
17 
continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance 
of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they 
could not achieve by relying only on the knowing 
relinquishment of constitutional rights. Of course it would 
be "practical" for the police to ignore the commands of the 
Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we mean that more 
criminals will be apprehended, even though the 
constitutional rights of innocent people also go by the 
board. But such a practical advantage is achieved only at 
the cost of permitting the police to disregard the limitations 
that the Constitution places on their behavior, a cost that 
a constitutional democracy cannot long absorb. 
412 U.S. at 288, Marshall J., dissenting. 
The majority of the Court in Schneckloth also noted that a requirement for 
knowledge of a right before a waiver is unnecessary when that right is not involved 
in the guarantee of a fair trial. As a result of this reasoning, the majority held that 
there is no requirement that courts indulge every presumption against a waiver of 
fourth amendment rights. However, that very requirement has been imposed to 
determine if there has been a waiver of fourth amendment rights, State v. Marshall. 
supra. Furthermore, by concluding that knowing waivers apply only to trial rights, the 
Court simply disregards the holding in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In 
that case, the Court required officers to inform a suspect of his privilege against self-
incrimination and right to counsel before conducting a custodial interrogation. Giving 
a statement to authorities is not a trial right such as the right to confrontation or the 
right to counsel. Consequently, the Court's reliance on this line of reasoning is 
inappropriate. 
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Finally, the Court in Schneckloth distinguishes the Miranda requirements 
because the situation in Schneckloth did not involve inherently coercive tactics. The 
Court further reasoned that the situation where a consent to search is obtained does 
not generally involve a defendant being in custody. Furthermore, a consent to search 
is often sought after a questionable or illegal detention or prior illegal search8 as was 
the situation in this case. Oftentimes, a consent to search is given under 
circumstances that are equally or more coercive than the custodial interrogation which 
the Miranda court sought to control. 
The reasoning supporting the conclusion in Schneckloth is obviously flawed. 
The dissenters all would have held that a fundamental constitutional right cannot be 
waived without one being aware of its existence. Justice Marshall summarized the 
need for this knowledge requirement and criticized the majority opinion stating, 
The holding today confines the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment against searches conducted without 
probable cause to the sophisticated, the knowledgeable, 
and I might add, the few. [footnote omitted] In the final 
analysis, the Court now sanctions a game of blindman's 
bluff, in which the police always have the upper hand, for 
the sake of nothing more than the convenience of the 
police. But the guarantees of the Fourth amendment were 
never intended to shrink before such an ephemeral and 
changeable interest. The f ramers of the Fourth Amendment 
struck the balance against this sort of convenience and in 
favor of certain basic civil rights. 
8See: State v. Sierra, supra; State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Sim$, supra; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Godina-
Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). 
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412 U.S. at 289-290, Marshall J., dissenting. 
A number of cases from other jurisdictions have also addressed this issue. The 
majority of those cases do not require knowledge of the right to consent. However, 
those cases fail to address the policies underlying the decision in Schneckloth. See: 
State v. Christofferson. 101 Ida. 156, 610 P.2d 515 (1980); Kino v. State. 557 
S.W.2d 386 (Ark.1977); State v. Rodoers. 349 N.W.2d 453 (Wis. 1984); Frink v. 
State. 597 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1979); State v. Stemole. 646 P.2d 539 (Mont. 1982). 
In State v. Osborn. 402 A.2d 493 (N.H. 1979), the court held that knowledge 
of the right to refuse is not a necessary component of a valid consent to search. In 
reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that proof of knowledge is not necessary 
as most people understand that the only practical consequence of a refusal to consent 
is to force the state to obtain a warrant authorizing the search. The flaw in this 
reasoning is demonstrated by the number of cases where a consent has been obtained 
after an illegal The information obtained from the primary illegality cannot be 
used to establi able cause to obtain a warrant. Silverthorn Lumber v. United 
States. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Consequently, a refusal to consent would not result 
in officer obtaining a valid warrant leading to admissible evidence. 
Another case that rejects this knowledge requirement is State v. Flores. 280 
Or. 273, 570 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977), that case lists four considerations in determining 
9See: State v. Sims, supra; State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991); State 
v. Carter, supra; State v. Godina-Luna. supra. 
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the need to give a different analysis to the state constitution than is given to the 
federal constitution. In addition to an analysis of textual and historical differences, 
the Oregon court in Flores also looked to the need to resolve unique local problems 
and the need for uniform standards for law enforcement. In Flores. the court found 
no widespread misconduct resulting in an infringement of suspect's rights. However 
in Utah, the cases previously cited indicate that law enforcement officers try to vitiate 
prior illegalities by obtaining a consent to search.10 Consequently, there is a unique 
local problem to be addressed under a state constitutional analysis. 
The policies favoring the need for a knowing consent include the importance 
of the waiver of a constitutional right and the inherently coercive nature of a police 
request to search. These policies were adopted in the cases from those jurisdictions 
that require proof of knowledge that person need not consent to a search before the 
evidence seized pursuant to such a search is admissible. In Lonastreet v. State. 592 
So.2d 16 (Miss. 1991), and Perrick v. State. 440 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1983), the court 
relied on the same standard to establish consent to search as is required to prove 
waiver of any other constitutional right. That standard requires proof of both 
knowledge of the right and voluntary waiver of that right. In State v. Johnson. 68 
N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975), the court relied on reasoning similar to that asserted 
by Justice Marshall in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. supra. In Johnson, the court noted 
that most persons view a request to search by a police officer as having the force of 
10See: footnote 8, supra. 
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the law. The court went on to note that one's assent to such a request is not 
meaningful unless the person involved knew he had the right accede to it. 
There is no question that it is a minority position in the courts to require both 
voluntariness and knowledge of the right to refuse to consent to a search before 
evidence seized pursuant to such a search is admissible. However, the policy reasons 
supporting such a position are much more compelling than the policies supporting the 
federal standard. This court should impose such a knowledge requirement for a 
consent to search under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. In doing so 
this court should conclude that any consent given in this case does not justify the 
search resulting in the discovery of the marijuana. 
POINT III 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE LACKED 
ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL ILLEGAL STOP, 
MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED INADMISSABLE. 
For evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to search, that consent 
must be voluntary and it must be attenuated from any prior illegal search or seizure. 
State v. Arrovo. supra, State v. Thurman, supra. If the court finds that the consent 
is involuntary, this attenuation analysis need not be reached. However, if the consent 
is found to be voluntary, then the court must determine if that consent was 
attenuated from the illegal detention. 
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To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated from a prior illegal 
stop or search, an analysis of three factors is required. Those factors were initially 
described in Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). The factors include: the 
temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of consent, the presence 
or absence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal 
police conduct. In a number of cases this court has analyzed these factors and found 
as a matter of law that the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the initial 
illegal detention.11 All of those cases involve situations where the consent was 
given during an unlawful detention. 
The only case where this court held that the consent was not tainted by the 
prior illegal stop is State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992). In that case, 
the officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation. The driver's license, 
registration and traffic ticket were returned. The officer allowed the defendant to 
leave. The defendant did not do so, but stayed and asked the officer questions. As 
a result of that questioning, a consent to search the vehicle was obtained. The 
instant case is clearly distinguishable from Castner. The defendant in this case was 
never free to leave after the initial stop and during the illegal detention. Sergeant 
Mangleson requested the consent to search immediately after stopping the vehicle 
11State v. Sims, supra; State v. Park, supra; State v. Carter, supra; State v. 
Robinson, supra; State v. Godina-Luna. supra; State v. Small. 829 P.2d 129 (Utah 
App.) ££££• denied 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
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and obtaining the driver's license and registration. Mangleson indicated the purpose 
for the stop was to search the vehicle and he was prepared to do so without the 
driver's consent. 
In State v. Thurman. supra, the Supreme Court of Utah found that a consent 
was sufficiently attenuated from any fourth amendment violation to allow the 
evidence to be admissible. In Thurman officers conducting a homicide investigation 
executed a warrant on the defendant's home. Several hours later, at a location away 
from the residence that was searched, the defendant consented to the search of a 
storage unit. He signed the written consent form. Due to the separation of time and 
location, the court found sufficient attenuation to make the evidence seized pursuant 
to the voluntary consent admissible. The time and location circumstances distinguish 
the instant case from Thurman. Furthermore, Thurman did not involve issue of an 
unlawful detention as is in involved in this case. Nor was the consent in Thurman 
given during such a detention. 
The second factor from Arroyo involves an analysis of intervening 
circumstances. The instant case is again analogous to Robinson. Sims and Park 
where no such circumstances were found. Courts in other jurisdictions have found 
intervening circumstances to include a release from custody and appearance before 
the magistrate, discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an unrelated charge, 
United States v. Delaadillo-VelasQuez. 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1988). Other 
intervening circumstances that may establish sufficient attenuation include: giving of 
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the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant to consult with a passenger, United 
States v. Berrv, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983); Juarez v. State. 708 S.W.2d 772 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988); telling the defendant that he did not have to consent to the 
search, Reves v. State. 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); developing probable 
cause from independent sources to justify the detention, Untied States v. Cherry. 794 
F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); and whether the consent was volunteered or requested, 
People v. Boroes. 69 N.Y.2d 1031, 511 N.E.2d 58 (1987). None of these 
circumstances or other analogous circumstances were present in this case. 
Consequently, this factor also weighs against the state. 
The final factor to be analyzed is the purpose and flagrancy of the detention. 
The more flagrant the violation, Thurman requires additional intervening circumstances 
and the passage of more time before the evidence may be admissible. In Sims the 
court indicated that if the purposes of the roadblock were good then the unlawful 
detention may be overlooked.12 The court in Sims found that a roadblock for 
multiple purposes did not outweigh the other factors in this attenuation analysis. 
Likewise, the purpose of the stop in the instant case could not outweigh the effect 
of the first two factors. Mangleson testified that he intended to search, seize and 
forfeit the vehicle even if consent was not obtained to do so or even if contraband 
was not located. Those actions and intentions indicate a particularly flagrant violation. 
12A more logical reading of this factor is that if the initial illegality was for a 
particularly bad purpose or was a flagrant violation, then the evidence may be ordered 
to be suppressed in spite of favorable analysis for the State on the other two factors. 
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If this court finds that the consent in this case was voluntary, that voluntariness 
is tainted by the prior illegal detention. The detention and any consent were closely 
related in time and there were no intervening circumstances. In fact, the consent was 
given during the unlawful detention. The sole purpose of the detention was to search 
the vehicle. Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of the search is 
inadmissible. 
CONCLUSION 
The stop and search of the vehicle that the defendant was driving violated both 
the fourth amendment and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The 
evidence seized as a result of that stop and search is inadmissible. The judgement 
and conviction entered below should be reversed and the case remanded to the 
district court with an order requiring that the evidence be suppressed. 
Dated this day of February, 1994. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES JOHN CONTREL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 920133 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
October 22, 1992 upon the Defendant's Motion to Suppress before the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorneys, Stephen R. McCaughey and Barry 
Witlin. The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr., 
Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the 
plaintiff and defendant, reviewed the Memorandums of Law and 
arguments of counsel, and having submitted its Memorandum Decision. 
The Court being fully advised in the premises makes the 
1 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 4, 1992 Sergeant Paul Mangelson, a 25 year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol was patrolling 1-15 within Juab 
County together with Trooper Lance Bushnell. 
2. Both Sergeant Mangelson and Trooper Bushnell have had 
extensive training and experience in the area of drug law 
enforcement and drug identification. Sergeant Mangelson has been 
involved in many cases involving compartments within motor vehicles 
used to conceal controlled substances. 
3. While patrolling, Sergeant Mangelson observed a northbound 
pickup truck, and made the following observations prior to stopping 
the vehicle: 
a. The vehicle was a 1990 Chevrolet pickup. 
b. The edge of the rear bumper had been bent so as to 
conceal the area behind it. 
c. The gas tank was much lower than that of a stock model 
truck. 
d. The vehicle had been recently undercoated (observable in 
the rear tire area). 
e. Unlike stock model vehicles, the vehicle had no air space 
between the truck bed and the frame. 
f• The vehicle also had bright yellow, oversized shock 
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absorbers, a bed liner, and a tool box in the bed area. 
4. Sergeant Mangelson noted that the vehicle was identical 
in every respect (except for its color) to a vehicle he had seized 
several months earlier containing a secret compartment behind the 
bumper in which Mangelson had discovered large quantities of 
contraband. 
5. Based upon Sergeant Mangelsonfs observations and his past 
experience, the officers stopped the vehicle, with the intent to 
search the vehicle for a hidden compartment. 
6. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, James John 
Contrel. The driver produced a Florida driver's license and a 
Pennsylvania registration. The driver said the vehicle belonged 
to his friend Carmen, but he did not know Carmen's address or 
telephone number. 
7. The officer asked the defendant if he was transporting 
drugs or if there were any firearms or contraband in the vehicle. 
The defendant replied "No". The officer then asked for consent to 
search the vehicle. The defendant gave consent to search the 
vehicle, both orally and in writing. 
8. The officers then went to the rear of the vehicle and 
accessed the secret compartment, exactly as Sergeant Mangelson did 
in the previous case, and after they removed the cover plate, found 
in excess of 100 lbs. of marijuana in the hidden compartment. The 
defendant was thereafter arrested. 
3 
Pursuant to the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The stop of the subject vehicle was a constitutionally 
valid stop based upon reasonable suspicion that the subject vehicle 
had a hidden compartment containing contraband. 
2. The detainment of the defendant after the stop was 
reasonable to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 
3. The defendant's consent to search the vehicle and waiver 
of his constitutional rights was voluntary. 
4. Although a knowing waiver of his constitutional rights 
under the U.S. and Utah Constitution is not necessary when giving 
a consent to search, the defendant in this case did make a knowing 
waiver when he gave his written consent. 
5. The defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
Clerk of Dismct Court, Juab Couruy 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES JOHN CONTREL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 920133 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
previously entered by the Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Dated this ^ day of £S£Ht£^ , 1993. 
